

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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P 120840Z AUG 75

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4205

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PEKING 1503

EXDIS

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES H.) CH

SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING'S REMARKS TO CODEL PERCY

REF: PEKING 1458

1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: MEETING WITH CODEL PERCY  
ON AUGUST 6, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING GAVE A  
SMOOTH PERFORMANCE IN MAKING TO THIS LATEST GROUP OF  
IMPORTANT AMERICANS LARGELY THE SAME POINTS THAT THE  
CHINESE HAVE BEEN MAKING TO SUCH GROUPS SINCE LAST  
FALL. HOWEVER, WITHIN OR ALONG WITH HIS TO-BE-EXPECTED  
RESPONSES TO THE CODEL'S QUESTIONS ON VARIOUS BILATERAL AND  
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, TENG:

--DESCRIBED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. BILATERAL  
RELATIONS AS "ALL RIGHT...NORMAL" CONSIDERING THAT THE  
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE, TAIWAN, REMAINS UNSETTLED;

--EXPLICITLY REITERATED THE CHINESE ATTITUDE  
TOWARD PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT AS EXPRESSEE TO THE  
ASNE GROUP IN JUNE (HIS REMARKS TO PERCY ON THE  
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AND ON CHINA'S STANCE TOWARD THE  
TAIWAN ISSUE ARE REPORTED IN REFTEL);

--AGAIN EXPRESSED THE PRC'S ADMIRATION FOR  
FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON, AND IN DOING SO CITED MAO'S  
GREETINGS TO NIXON IN JULY VIA THE THAI PRIME MINISTER;

--SAID CHINA COULD DO NOTHING ABOUT IT IF TAIWAN  
WERE TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT ASKED POINTEDLY:  
"WHO WILL TRANSFER THE TECHNOLOGY?";

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--REAFFIRMED THAT FOR JAPAN, U.S.- JAPANESE RELATIONS

SHOULD HAVE PRIMACY;

--DECLINED TO ACKNOWLEDGE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR NORTH KOREA'S CONDUCT, BUT THREE TIMES (TWICE DURING THE GENERAL SESSION AND ONCE AGAIN OVER LUNCH WITH PERCY) MAINTAINED THAT ANY DANGER OF WAR WOULD COME FROM PARK;

--PASSED UP OPPORTUNITIES TO PUSH FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM KOREA, LIMITING HIMSELF INSTEAD TO SAYING ON ONE OCCASION THAT OUR HAVING FORCES THERE GAVE US RESPONSIBILITIES VIS-A-VIS PARK;

--WITHOUT EXPLICITLY REFERRING TO THE CHINESE LINE ABOUT THE INEVITABILITY OF EITHER WAR OR REVOLUTION, MAINTAINED THAT CHINA NEEDS A "GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT" IN WHICH TO DEVELOP ITSELF AND THAT IN POINTING TO THE DANGER OF A WORLD WAR--WITH THE GREATER DANGER COMING FROM THE SOVIET UNION--CHINA PERHAPS WAS HELPING TO POSTPONE THAT WAR;

--EVINCED CONTINUING LOW REGARD FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL;

--DID NOT, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, COMMENT ON MRS. GHANDI'S RECENT DOMESTIC ACTIONS, BUT SAID SHE HAD DONE "A MOST STUPID THING" IN TAKING OVER SIKKIM WHICH SHE HAD CONTROLLED ALL ALONG ANYWAY. HE REFERRED TO INDIA AS A "SUBSUPERPOWER" THAT IS "OUT TO CONTROL ASIA" AND WANTS TO DISMEMBER PAKISTAN A SECOND TIME."

2. LEST UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE BE ATTACHED TO THE FACT THAT TENG, AS NOTED ABOVE, DID NOT REITERATE THE STANDARD CHINESE PUBLIC LINE ABOUT (1) THE U.S. TROOPS PRESENCE IN KOREA AND (2) THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR OR REVOLUTION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HE WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKED ABOUT EITHER MATTER. HIS HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTION, WHILE CONSISTENT WITH HIS GENERAL "WE CAN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" LINE, STILL STRIKES US AS CURIOUS (PERHAPS ON THIS ONE HE WAS WINGING IT A BIT).  
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

3. VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING MET ON AUGUST 6 FOR A LITTLE OVER TWO HOURS WITH CODEL PERCY (INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL

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SPOUSES, CHILDREN, AND STANFORD PROFESSOR JOHN LEWIS) AND THEN HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR THEM. BUSH WAS PRESENT ON BOTH OCCASIONS. BY AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES BEFOREHAND, EACH OF THE SEVEN CODEL PRINCIPALS TOOK ABOUT TEN MINUTES WITH TENG IN THE GENERAL SESSION. AT THE LUNCHEON PERCY HAD TENG LARGELY TO HIMSELF WHILE JAVITS, WITHOUT ANY DISCERNABLE EFFECT, HOMED IN ON VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG ABOUT THE MIDDLE

EAST. THOUGH SMOKING CIGARETTES NON-STOP DURING THE MEETING AND FREQUENTLY DURING THE LUNCH, TENG SEEMED VERY MUCH AT EASE BUT PERHAPS SLIGHTLY BORED. WANG WAS HER USUAL SELF, A MODEL OF TACITURNITY.

4. WITH THE THOUGHT THAT CODEL ANDERSON MIGHT FIND THEM USEFUL IN FORMULATING ITS QUESTIONS TO CHINESE LEADERS, THERE FOLLOW--EXCEPT AS COVERED IN REFTEL--MAJOR EXCERPTS BY TOPIC FROM TENG'S REMARKS TO THE PERCY GROUP, (THIS MATERIAL IS BASED ENTIRELY ON BUSH'S NOTES OF THE MEETING AND LUNCHEON; WE ARE FORWARDING BY SEPTTEL PERCY'S MEMCON OF HIS LUNCHEON EXCHANGES WITH TENG. PERCY DICTATED THIS THE NEXT EVENING; AND LATER--BY MEANS OF TWO PHONE CALLS TO USLO AFTER THE CODEL LEFT PEKING MODIFIED IT SLIGHTLY, BUT WE THINK WE HAVE IT ALL NOW. THE CODEL APPOINTED LEWIS ITS NOTETAKER FOR THE MEETING; SEVERAL OF THE CODEL MEMBERS WERE ALSO TAKING NOTES; POSSIBLY SOME OF THESE WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT UPON THE CODEL'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON. BUSH'S NOTES ARE BEING FORWARDED BY O-I LETTER TO PRGM. THE TENG STATEMENTS IN QUOTATION MARKS ARE VERBATIM OR NEARLY SO.

5. SINO-U.S. RELATIONS: EARLY IN THE GENERAL SESSION, IN RESPONSE TO PERCY'S REQUEST FOR THE CHINESE VIEW OF WHERE WE'VE SUCCEEDED AND WHERE WE'VE NOT LIVED UP TO FULL EXPECTATIONS SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, TENG DELIVERED HIMSELF OF THE FOLLOWING:  
".....SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, CHINA HAS BEEN OPEN TO THE U.S. WE HAVE A HIGH ESTIMATION OF THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4206

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 PEKING 1503

EXDIS

COURAGEOUS DECISION TAKEN BY YOUR FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON IN COMING TO PEKING AND SIGNING THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. WE DON'T ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE WATERGATE AFFAIR. WE DO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SUCH A DECISION BY MR. NIXON. WHEN CHAIRMAN MAO MET PRIME MINISTER KHUKRIT HE ASKED KHUKRIT TO CONVEY HIS GREETING TO MR. NIXON BECAUSE KHUKRIT SAID HE KNEW MR. NIXON WELL. WE'VE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS HAS BEEN ALL RIGHT-- HAS BEEN NORMAL. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BETWEEN US THAT REMAINS UNSETTLED IS TAIWAN. CONSIDERING THAT, THE PRC-US RELATIONSHIP IS ALL RIGHT."

PERCY NEXT ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT FORD WOULD TAKE UP THE TAIWAN ISSUE, AND WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WOULD BE SYMBOLIC OR SUBSTANTIVE. HE POINTED OUT THAT CONGRESS (WHOSE IMPORTANCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND RELATIVE PERMANENCE, HE HAD DISCUSSED EARLIER) WAS VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN THE ISSUES OF TAIWAN AND TRADE. TENG'S REPLY:

" WE HAVE STATED OUR POSITION ON THIS POINT ON MANY OCCASIONS. NOT LONG AGO WHEN THE ASNE DELEGATION CAME TO VISIT CHINA WE TOOK UP THESE QUESTIONS WITH THEM. AT THAT TIME THEY ASKED 'WHAT IF NOTHING IS SETTLED DURING THE FORD VISIT?' I  
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TOLD THEM IT IS ALL RIGHT IF HE COMES WHETHER QUESTIONS ARE SETTLED OR NOT. IT IS GOOD TO HAVE THE PERSONAL CONTACT. WE WILL LEAVE THE REST TO PRESIDENT FORD."

6. GENERAL STANCE ON WORLD AFFAIRS: IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR JAVITS' PITCH FOR SINO-U.S. COOPERATION ON ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE, TENG SAID:

" IN THE WORLD THERE ARE CERTAIN PEOPLE WHO ACCUSE CHINA OF BEING WARLIKE, STATING CHINA LIKES TO WAGE WARS. IN A CERTAIN SENSE THAT IS TRUE. WHEN CHIANG KAI-SHEK TOOK UP KNIVES AGAINST THE PEOPLE, WE WERE FORCED TO FIGHT. IN THIS SENSE WE WERE WARLIKE. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA, WE FOUGHT WITH THE KOREAN PEOPLE AGAINST THE U.S. WE SAID, 'WHEN A CERTAIN LIMIT IS PASSED WE ARE COMPELLED TO SEND OUR TROOPS THERE.'

THEREAFTER, WE SAID THERE INDEED EXISTS THE DANGER OF A THIRD WORLD WAR. THOSE WHO ARE QUALIFIED TO WAGE WORLD WAR III ARE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE GREATER DANGER IS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE ONLY SPOKEN OUT ON THE NATURE OF THINGS, BUT IN OUR HEART WE DO NOT WANT A WAR. CHINA IS SUCH A POOR COUNTRY. WE NEED A GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TO DEVELOP OURSELVES. WE HAVE OUR OWN PLANS, BUT WE NEED A GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. IF THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD ARE AWARE OF THE DANGER OF A WORLD WAR, PERHAPS OUR POSITION WILL HELP IN THE POST-PONEMENT OF THAT WAR. IF WE CAN MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF OURSELVES, FIRST, WE ARE MOST PEACE-LOVING AND, SECOND, WE DON'T WANT A WAR, BUT IF IT BREAKS OUT THERE IS NOTHING TERRIBLE IN THAT. THERE ARE TWO ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DANGERS OF WAR. ONE, SOME PEOPLE ARE FIGHTENED OUT OF THEIR WITS. SECOND, WHAT IS THE USE IN BEING AFRAID--CATASTROPHE WILL COME AT ANY RATE SO WHY BE AFRAID OF THAT. IF PEOPLE FEAR WAR DAY AND NIGHT, WE'LL NEED 10,000 HOSPITALS IN CHINA TO CURE THE NERVOUS BREAKDOWNS (LAUGHTER).  
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ON KOREA, AS FAR AS WE KNOW, AS LONG AS PARK DOESN'T WAGE A WAR THERE WILL BE NOTHING SIGNIFICANT HAPPENING. WE CAN HELP IN STRIVING FOR PEACE BY POINTING OUT THE DANGER OF WAR. THIS IS OUR CONTRIBUTION. AS FOR OUR SUPPORT FOR THE OPPRESSED NATIONS, TO HELP THEM, WE WILL DO THAT. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WAR."

FINDLEY LATER ON REFERRED TO OUR AND CHINA'S HAVING A COMMON PROBLEM--SOVIET HEGEMONISM--AND ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO RESIST IT, GIVEN THE INABILITY OF THE UN TO CARRY OUT POLICY. TENG:

"NOW A BIG NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE OPPOSING SOVIET HEGEMONISM. OUR SUPPORT FOR A UNITED AND STRONG EUROPE IS AN ACT OF RESISTING HEGEMONISM. OBVIOUSLY THAT IS AGAINST SOVIET HEGEMONISM IT IS VENEFICIAL FOR EUROPE TO HAVE A PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. THE U.S. CAN HAVE A SOLID RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF EQUAL PARTNERSHIP. WE SUPPORT THE POSITION THAT THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA BELONGS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES. THIS IS AN ACT OF OPPOSING HEGEMONISM. WE HAVE THE SAME PURPOSE IN MIND IN MAKING THE PERSIAN GULF, THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA A ZONE OF PEACE."

FINDLEY THEN ASKED IF A REDUCTION OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WOULD NOT OPEN THE WAY FOR MORE HEGEMONISM. TENG FIRST REFERRED TO CHINA'S GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING FOREIGN BASES AND TROOPS, THEN NOTED THE NEED FOR A "REALISTIC APPROACH," AND ADDED:

"I TOLD THIS TO OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND TO SUCH SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AS THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND. WE ALSO TOLD THIS TO JAPAN. SOME AMERICANS ARE SAYING THEY ARE WORRIED BECAUSE IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA ADVERSELY AFFECT THE JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE TOLD JAPAN THEIR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE SECOND CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIORITY CHINA AND JAPAN."

HECKLET ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS POSED MORE OF A THREAT TO CHINA OR TO NATO, AND ALSO WHY THE CHINESE WERE DIGGING TUNNELS. TENG:

"IN OUR VIEW, SOVIET STRATEGY IS TO POINT IN THE EAST WHILE ATTACKING IN THE WEST. THEIR FOCUS OF STRATEGY IN EUROPE INCLUDES THE MEDITERRANEAN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4207

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 PEKING 1503

EXDIS

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES H.) CH

SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING'S REMARKS TO CODEL PERCY

REF: PEKING 1458

AND EVEN THE PERSIAN GULF. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE HAS NOT CHANGED THE SITUATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE OVER ONE MILLION TROOPS ON THE PRC BORDER. THESE TROOPS ARE SPREAD OVER 7,200 KM. THEY ARE NOT OF MUCH VALUE. IN OUR VIEW IT IS NOT EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A DECISION TO ATTACK CHINA. IF THE SOVIETS LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST CHINA, EVEN IF THEY USE BIG FORCE TO OCCUPY CHINESE TERRITORY, EVEN PEKING, THEY HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO FIGHT AT LEAST TWO DECADES. BUT WE MUST BE ON GUARD AGAINST SOVIET DESIGNS. THAT IS WHY WE DIG TUNNELS."

7. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: IN ASKING TENG ABOUT THE PRC'S POSITION TOWARD NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, STEVENSON MENTIONED THAT TAIWAN, JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA ALL HAD THE CAPABILITY OF BECOMING NUCLEAR POWERS. TENG INITIALLY RESPONDED WITH GENERAL FORMULA, "WE DON'T GO IN FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, BUT WHERE OTHERS PROLIFERATE WE CAN DO NOTHING, "AND A DIG AT INDIA (WHICH HAD ALSO BEEN MENTIONED BY PELL) "AS  
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FOR INDIA, IT WOULD RATHER STARVE AND HAVE NOTHING TO EAT AND HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT IS ITS RIGHT." WITHOUT RESPONDING SPECIFICALLY TO PELL'S MENTION OF JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA, TENG THEN SAID: "TAIWAN CAN DECIDE FOR ITSELF IF IT WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHO WILL TRANSFER THE TECHNOLOGY? THIS IS SOMETHING WE CAN DO NOTHING ABOUT."

IN A FURTHER EXCHANGE WITH STEVENSON ON DISARMAMENT, TENG STATED THE CHINESE POSITION IN THESE TERMS: "FIRST, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD YOU AND THE USSR RESORT TO FIRST USE AND, SECOND, YOU SHOULD GRADUALLY DESTROY ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HE CONCLUDED: "IN MY VIEW THIS CAN'T BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE PRESENT STAGE." AFTER REITERATING HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE U.S. AND USSR SHOULD RENOUNCE FIRST USE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES,

TENG THEN DEALT AS FOLLOWS WITH THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS: "IF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS TO BE HELD AND THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM IS NO FIRST USE AND THE SECOND IS COMPLETE AND TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEN CHINA WILL TAKE PART IN THE CONFERENCE."

8. KOREA: MCCLOSKEY, WHOSE TURN TO QUESTION TENG CAME LAST, DEVOTED HIS TIME SOLELY TO KOREA. HE REMARKED THAT AMERICANS LIKE HIMSELF WHO WERE IN KOREA IN THE '50'S THOUGHT THAT NORTH KOREA MIGHT BE RASH AND MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE THE U.S. DID WHEN IT DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THAT CHINA WOULD MOVE IF THE U.S. CROSSED THE 38TH PARALLEL. HE SAID THE U.S. MUST RESTRAIN PARK FROM COMMITTING AGRESSION, AND ASKED IF CHINA FOR ITS PART SHOULD NOT RESTRAIN KIM IL-SUNG. TENG:

"WELL, THE U.S. HAS SUCH OBLIGATIONS, BUT CHINA DOESN'T. CHINA DOESN'T HAVE TROOPS STATIONED IN NORTH KOREA. OUR CONSISTENT STAND IS THAT WE WON'T MAKE SUGGESTIONS ON THE POLICIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WE'VE GIVEN FIRM AND CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA." CONFIDENTIAL

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MCCLOSKEY'S REJOINER WAS THAT IF NORTH KOREA ATTACKED, THE U.S. MIGHT BE RELUCTANTLY DRAWN INTO ANOTHER WAR, THUS IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT KIM NOT ATTACK. TENG: "WE DON'T WORRY ABOUT NORTH KOREA. THE ONE THAT IS LIKELY TO LAUNCH THE ATTACK IS PARK." THEN THIS EXCHANGE ON HISTORY: MCCLOSKEY "IN THE KOREAN WAR, IF THE U.S. HAD NOT MADE THE MISTAKE OF CROSSING THE 38TH PARALLEL, WOULD CHINA NOT HAVE CROSSED THE YALU?"

TENG: "NO. DEFINITELY NOT."

MCCLOSKEY: "IF WE HADN'T BEEN MISTAKEN ON WHAT CHINA MIGHT DO, WE MIGHT NOT HAVE GONE TO WAR." TENG: "THIS MAINLY WAS BECAUSE THE U.S. MISCALCULATED ON THE POSITION OF CHINA."

OVER LUNCH PERCY ASKED TENG WHETHER THE TUNNELS IN KOREA WERE FOR OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. TENG FIRST NOTED THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS MANY MORE TROOPS THAN NORTH KOREA, THEN OBSERVED THAT KIM HAD CALLED THE TUNNELS A MYTH. PERCY ASKED WHETHER CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SHARED THIS VIEW; TENG RESPONDED THAT THE CHINESE BELIEVED



KIM.

9. SOUTH ASIA: PELL ASKED WHY THE CHINESE HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF SIKKIM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. TENG INDICATED THE CHINESE HAD CONSIDERED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT LABELING INDIA'S ACT A CLEAR ACT OF AGGRESSION SUFFICED. PELL PRESSED ON WHY THEY HADN'T INSCRIBED THE ISSUE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S AGENDA. TENG:

"WELL, WE NEVER CONSIDERED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN SETTLE ANY QUESTION. I THINK THIS INCIDENT HAS TOTALLY REVEALED WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT GHANDI'S IS. IT IS A GOOD THING BECAUSE IT REVEALED THE NATURE OF THE GHANDI GOVERNMENT. IN THE PAST, MANY COUNTRIES LAUDED INDIA. NOW SIKKIM HAS MADE THINGS CLEAR."

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TENG NEXT DISCUSSED OPPOSING HEGEMONISM IN TERMS OF OPPOSING NOT ONLY THE U.S. AND USSR BUT ALSO INDIA. HE REFERRED TO INDIA'S DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN, WITH THE USSR GIVING SUPPORT BEHIND THE SCENES. THEN,

"THE FIRST COUNTRY TO SUPPORT INDIA ON SIKKIM WAS THE USSR. MRS. GHANDI HAS DONE A MOST STUPID THING. SHE CONTROLLED SIKKIM ALL ALONG BUT NOW SHE'S DONE A MOST STUPID THING."

TENG FINISHED THIS TOPIC WITH: "PEOPLE SAY INDIA IS A SUB-SUPERPOWER OUT TO CONTROL ASIA. INDIA WANTS TO DISMEMBER PAKISTAN A SECOND TIME."

10. OTHER: IN THE GENERAL MEETING PELL BEGAN A DISCUSSION WITH TENG ON LOS ISSUES. AFTERWARDS HE WAS ABLE TO CONTINUE IT PRIVATELY WITH TENG FOR A FEW MOMENTS. PELL IS RETURNING HERE THIS WEEKEND ENROUTE TO EUROPE AND WE EXPECT TO GET A FULL READ-OUT FROM HIM THEN. FINLEY, SAYING HE BROUGHT GREETINGS FROM SECRETARY BUTZ, URGED GREATER EXCHANGES IN AGRICULTURE, AND MENTIONED AN INVITATION FROM BUTZ FOR THE PRC'S MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE TO VISIT THE U.S. FINDLEY ALSO URGED THAT THE HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO VISIT CHINA. TENG DID NOT REACT.  
BUSH

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